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(Hart Publishing, 2010) 
 
This Article considers the possibility of imposing liability in torts for a wrongfully 
created risk of future harm. We examine the American and English court decisions 
pertaining to this issue and consider whether a probability-based compensation for 
the victim’s expected—albeit not yet materialized—harm is just and efficient. We 
demonstrate how the virtues of a legal regime that allows a tort victim to recover 
compensation for her expected harm overshadow its vices. We conclude that a 
person’s risk of sustaining harm in the future should be actionable whenever the 
risk is substantial. We further conclude that it should be left to the victim to decide 
whether to recover for his or her expected harm, or else wait and see if the risk 
materializes and recover only if it does. We observe that allowing victims to make 
this choice might create a collective action problem. Because expedited 
compensation for a victim’s expected harm erodes the wrongdoer’s ability to 
compensate future claimants, victims would opt for an early recovery for expected 
harm even when their substantive remedial preferences are different. We 
demonstrate, however, that this problem can be resolved. 
* Alain Poher Professor of Law, Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law & Fischel-
Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. We thank Irit Brodsky 
for very able research assistance.  
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Introduction 
The House of Lords and the United States Supreme Court have 
recently addressed the issue of liability for a risk of future illness. 
This issue arose in connection with employees wrongfully exposed 
by their employers to asbestos. As a result of this wrongful exposure, 
the employees exhibited symptoms indicating an increased risk of 
developing fatal cancer diseases in the future. Both decisions have 
assumed as a common ground that this risk per se is not actionable in 
torts.1 This presupposition moved the focus of the Law Lords’ and 
the Justices’ attention from real harm to the ethereal damage. The 
issue adjudicated in both instances was whether the plaintiffs’ are 
1 This assumption is more explicit in the British than in the American decision. See 
below. 
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entitled to recover from their employers compensation for the mental 
anguish caused by the fear of developing cancer.    
 
The American case, Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayres,2 
involved railroad workers who sued their employer under the Federal 
Employers Liability Act. The suit attributed to the defendant liability 
for emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs as a consequence of 
contracting asbestosis. Each plaintiff contracted this disease 
following his exposure to an impermissibly hazardous quantity of 
asbestos, for which the defendant was unquestionably responsible. 
The plaintiffs’ emotional distress (fear and anxiety) originated from a 
worrying statistical fact: about ten percent of the people in a medical 
condition similar to theirs develop mesothelioma—a fatal cancerous 
disease—at some point in the future. The Supreme Court’s narrow 
(5-4) majority decision allowed recovery to plaintiffs whose distress 
was proven to be “genuine and serious.” Note again that recovery 
was allowed not for the increased risk of contracting cancer, but 
rather for the plaintiffs’ fear of becoming afflicted in the future. The 
Court’s decision relied on both policy and doctrine. As a policy 
matter, the Court underscored the problematics of the two-disease 
requirement that the defendant asked it to interpose: this requirement 
would deny compensation to an asbestosis sufferer who never 
develops cancer. As a result, this sufferer’s fear of contracting cancer 
at some point in the future—an undeniably harmful consequence of 
the defendant’s wrongdoing—would never be actionable in torts. As 
far as doctrine is concerned, courts across the United States have long 
recognized a tort victim’s right to sue for any serious emotional harm 
resulting from her present physical injury. Any such harm is part of 
the victim’s “pain and suffering.” This parasitic actionability is a 
deeply rooted common law principle. Allowing the plaintiffs to 
recover compensation for their asbestosis-induced fear therefore does 
not break away from the common law tradition.  
 
The dissenters’ objection to this decision alluded (inter alia) to its 
socially deleterious consequences. According to the dissent, the 
Court’s compensatory generosity might drain the funds available for 
compensating real asbestos victims for their physical injuries. These 
2 Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayres 538 U.S. 135 (2003) (hereinafter: 
“Ayers”). 
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injuries—held the dissent—are more immediate and more serious 
than the disruption of the plaintiffs’ peace of mind. 
 
The British case, Johnston v. NEI International Combustion Ltd,3 
involved plaintiffs who developed pleural plaques (fibrous thickening 
of pleural membranes surrounding the lungs). Pleural plaques are 
generally benign.  Nor do they cause any asbestos-related diseases. 
Those plaques, however, indicate the presence of asbestos fibers in 
the person’s lungs and pleura. Asbestos, in turn, may independently 
cause a cancerous disease—a grim prospect upon which the plaintiffs 
based their suit. According to the plaintiffs, anxiety and emotional 
distress associated with this prospect constitute compensable harm. 
 
The House of Lords disagreed. It held that a risk of future illness and 
the attendant anxiety are not actionable in torts as a stand-alone harm. 
The Law Lords clarified, however, that the parasitic actionability 
doctrine will still allow recovery in appropriate cases. That is, a 
person who sustains compensable injury can recover damages for the 
fear that the injury will develop into a more serious harm in the 
future. This factor makes Johnston the doctrinal equivalent of Ayres.  
The two decisions, however, are not completely identical to each 
other. Ayres contains no express pronouncement on whether a risk of 
future harm can ever become actionable as a stand-alone damage.4 
Johnston, in contrast, holds unequivocally that such risks are not 
actionable in torts. The Law Lords’ adherence to the parasitic 
actionability doctrine was unambiguous and unqualified.5  
 
In the pages ahead, we conduct a normative exploration of this issue. 
We examine the desirability of a rule that imposes negligence-based 
liability for a risk of future illness even when there is no any physical 
harm in the present. Our desirability criteria are efficiency and 
justice. Based on these criteria, we articulate the reasons for making a 
stand-alone risk of future illness actionable in torts. We argue that a 
3Johnston v. NEI International Combustion Ltd [2007] UKHL 39 (hereinafter: 
“Johnston”). 
4 See Ayres, above n 2, at 153 (Justice Ginsburg opinion): ‘But the asbestosis 
claimants did not seek, and the trial court did not allow, discrete damages for their 
increased risk of future cancer.’ 
5 Johnston, above n 3, at 10, 17, 32, 38, 40-41. 
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person wrongfully exposed to such risk should be entitled to 
probabilistic compensation that matches his prospect of becoming ill. 
This compensation should equal the harm resulting from the illness 
multiplied by the illness’s probability. 
  
After demonstrating the efficiency and justice of this proposal, we 
discuss counterarguments. We first consider the objections to the 
probabilistic recovery rule as applying in cases of indeterminate 
causation. Those cases involve physical injury that may or may not 
have been caused by the defendant’s negligence (“past-injury 
cases”). We show that arguments against probabilistic recovery in 
past-injury cases do not hold with respect to risks of future injury. 
We then discuss two additional objections to our proposal. One of 
them holds that small risks of future illness should not be actionable: 
allowing people sue for such risks would be more costly than 
beneficial. We agree with this point and limit our proposal to suits 
involving substantial risk of illness.  
 
A much stronger objection to our proposal identifies a serious 
problem of collective action. Our proposal would allow tort victims 
to choose between immediate compensation for the risk of future 
illness and the “wait and see” strategy. Victims who choose to wait 
and see would either become ill or avoid the illness. Victims who 
ultimately avoid the illness would not be able to sue the defendant. 
The remaining ill victims would become eligible to full 
compensation for the harm suffered. Alas, those victims’ ability to 
recover compensation would depend on the defendant’s solvency. If 
the defendant becomes insolvent, it would not compensate those 
victims. The defendant’s prospect of remaining solvent would 
crucially depend on the victims’ initial choice. If many victims 
choose to recover the immediate probability-based compensation, the 
defendant’s funds may shrink to a degree that will deny 
compensation to wait-and-seers. Every victim would anticipate this 
contingency. The victims, however, would not be able to coordinate 
their suits because the required coordination is too costly to establish 
and enforce. Absence of coordination and the diluted-fund prospect 
would prompt all victims to opt for the instant probability-based 
recovery. 
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This problem is real. We believe, however, that it can be resolved by 
courts or through governmental intervention and offer two such 
solutions. 
 
Structurally, our argument unfolds in three parts. In Part I, we carry 
out a comparative analysis of Ayres and Johnston. In Part II, we 
analyze the virtues and vices of probabilistic recovery in past-injury 
cases (also identifiable as cases of indeterminate causation) and relate 
this analysis to the future illness problem. In Part III, we make out 
the case for making risks of future illness actionable in torts and 
develop a number of suggestions on how to operationalize this 
proposal. A short conclusion follows. 
I. Ayres v. Johnston  
A. Ayres 
In Ayres,6 the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether an employee wrongfully exposed to asbestos at work is 
entitled to recover from his employer compensation for the fear of 
developing cancer. The plaintiffs suffered from asbestosis caused by 
a work-related excessive exposure to asbestos. About ten percent of 
the people suffering from this disease develop fatal cancer. Five 
Justices allowed recovery for the plaintiffs’ fear. Specifically, they 
affirmed the plaintiffs’ recoveries for pain and suffering—mostly 
fear-related7—ranging from $500,000 to $1,200,000.8 The dissent 
opined that no such recovery should be allowed.  
 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, held that mental anguish 
resulting from a person’s fear of developing cancer in the future is 
compensable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act9 as part of a 
successful plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation for pain and 
6  Ayres, above n 2. 
7  Justice Kennedy emphasized that the plaintiffs have sustained no significant 
harm other than this fear. See Ayres, above n  2, at 179-180. 
8  The lower recovery amounts were awarded to smokers due to their comparative 
negligence. Ayres, above n  2, at 179..  
9  Federal Employers’ Liability Act 45 U.S.C.S. §  51 et seq. 
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suffering.10 She set two cumulative conditions for a plaintiff’s 
eligibility for this compensation. First, the plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his fear is genuine and serious.11 
Second, the plaintiff must preponderantly establish that this fear 
results from an illness for which the defendant is responsible.12 
 
Justice Kennedy spoke for the dissent. According to him, the 
plaintiffs’ suits are causatively weak. First, the alleged fears cannot 
be considered a direct consequence of the plaintiffs’ disease.13 
Second, there is no dependable scientific proof of the causal nexus 
between the plaintiffs’ disease and cancer.14 Third, the alleged harms 
are speculative and quantitatively insignificant, given the presence of 
a significant asbestos-unrelated risk of contracting cancer (for 
smokers, in particular).15 Justice Kennedy also alluded to social 
policy. According to him, making bare fears of cancer compensable 
would exhaust the financial resources that defendants could use for 
compensating asbestos victims who actually develop cancer.16  
 
Justice Breyer took a middle-ground approach. He agreed with the 
Court that a tort victim’s fear of a future illness should be actionable 
when it is genuine, serious, and originates from a proven disease. 
Yet, according to him, compensation for such fear should be 
generally unavailable when the following conditions are present: 
 
(1) actual development of the disease can neither be 
expected nor ruled out for many years; 
(2) fear of the disease is separately compensable if the 
disease occurs; and  
10 Ayres, above n  2. 
11 Ayres, above n  2, at 157. Another issue was whether damages should be 
apportioned among multiple tortfeasors in a way that would allow the defendant to 
reduce its compensation duty to the plaintiff. The Justices have reached a 
unanimous opinion that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act allows no such 
apportionment, ibid, at 159-166, but the defendants could still bring 
‘indemnification and contribution actions against third parties under otherwise 
applicable state or federal law.’ Ibid, at 162.  
12 Ayres, above n 2, at p 157. 
13 Ayres, above n 2, at 171-172.  
14 Ayres, above n 2, at 173 
15 Ayres, above n 2, at 179. 
16 Ayres, above n 2, at pp. 168-169.  
FUTURE HARM 12-8-09 8/18/2009 1:46 PM  
8 Future Harm [Vol. nnn:nnn 
 
 
                                                     
(3) fear of the disease is based upon risks not 
significantly different in kind from the background 
risks that all individuals face.17  
Justice Breyer clarified that these compensation-denying rules are not 
meant to be rigid: 
  
‘This is not to say that fear of cancer is never 
reimbursable. The conditions above may not hold. Even 
when they do, I would, consistent with the sense of the 
common law, permit recovery where the fear of cancer is 
unusually severe – where it significantly and detrimentally 
affects the plaintiff’s ability to carry on with everyday life 
and work.’18 
B. Johnston 
In Johnston, as in Ayres, the plaintiffs were exposed to excessive 
quantities of asbestos by their employers. The plaintiffs, however, 
contracted no recognizable diseases (with the exception of one 
plaintiff who developed clinical depression). Instead, they developed 
pleural plaques—a condition not amounting to a physical impairment 
or disablement. Not being a disease, pleural plaques indicate the 
presence of asbestos fibers in the person’s lungs. This contamination 
puts the person at risk of developing cancer in the future.19  
 
This risk may instill in the person fear of death and related anxieties. 
Alternatively, it may exacerbate a person’s preexisting fear and 
anxiety. The plaintiffs in Johnston have developed such anxieties. 
The House of Lords consequently had to decide whether this mental 
and emotional anguish constitutes compensable damage under the 
negligence doctrine.20 
 
The Law Lords decided that it does not. This holding was both 
categorical and unanimous (it also extended to the plaintiff with a 
17 Ayres, above n  2, at 187. 
18 Ibid. 
19 As attested in Johnston, above n 3, at para 80, ‘The Claimant is at risk of future 
development of asbestosis (1%), diffuse pleural thickening (1%) and mesothelioma 
(5%) and as a result suffers anxiety for his future health and welfare.’  
20 The Law Lords parenthetically mentioned the possibility of a contract-based 
action, but made no decision on that matter since it was not argued by the plaintiffs. 
Johnston, above n 3, at paras 59, 74.  
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fully-blown depression). The Law Lords dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
argument that a combination of non-actionable plaques, a non-
actionable risk of illness and a non-actionable anxiety constitutes 
actionable harm.21 As Lord Scott explained, this argument fails 
‘because [n]aught plus naught plus naught equals naught.’22 The Law 
Lords clarified, however, that presence of an actionable injury—
asbestosis being an example—would make the attendant anxiety 
actionable as well.23  
  
C. Ayres, Johnston, and Liability for Future Harms 
We now attempt to extrapolate the two courts’ attitude toward 
liability for a wrongfully imposed risk of illness. We leave behind the 
anxiety-related causes of action and focus instead on the risk of 
illness as compensable harm. We distinguish, as the courts did, 
between two scenarios. In the first scenario, the risk of illness 
originates from the plaintiff’s actionable injury, for which the 
defendant is responsible. In the second, the plaintiff sustains no 
actionable injury and sues the defendant for the risk of harm as a 
stand-alone damage.  
 
Under the first scenario, the Law Lords in Johnston would impose 
liability for the risk. As Lord Scott explained:  
 
‘[I]t is common ground that if some physical injury has 
been caused by the negligence, so that a tortious cause of 
action has accrued to the victim, the victim can recover 
damages not simply for his injury in its present state but 
also for the risk that the injury may worsen in the future 
…’24 
 
Ayres did not address this issue. 
 
Under the second scenario, the Law Lords in Johnston would impose 
no liability whatsoever. As already indicated, they held unanimously 
that a stand-alone risk of future harm does not constitute actionable 
21 Johnston, above n 3, at para 89. 
22 Ibid, at para 73. 
23 Ibid, at para 67. 
24 Ibid. 
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harm.25 The Ayres decision did not address this issue expressly,26  but 
it seems that also American Law would preclude liability for a stand-
alone risk of future illness. 
II. Past Harm 
A. Paradigmatic Cases 
The problem of indeterminate causation arises when the defendant 
may or may not be the cause of the harm wrongfully inflicted on the 
plaintiff.27 In the next few paragraphs, we present the paradigmatic 
cases in which this problem arises. 
 
Consider a case in which several wrongdoers, acting independently 
of each other, negligently expose the plaintiff to a risk of sustaining 
harm. The plaintiff consequently faces several independent risks of 
sustaining harm. One of those risks materializes and the plaintiff 
suffers harm. This harm was brought about by one of the 
wrongdoers, whose identity is unknown. 
 
In this type of cases—labeled “unidentifiable wrongdoer”—both 
English and American courts allowed recovery. They held that the 
wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s 
damage.28 As an alternative to this remedy, courts could have 
awarded prorated recovery: an award that equals the plaintiff’s harm 
multiplied by each defendant’s probability of being the cause of the 
harm (the “probabilistic recovery principle,” or PRP, for short). 
25 See above Part I.A. 
26 See above n 4 and accompanying text. 
27 In other cases that we discussed elsewhere, the defendant caused part of the 
plaintiff’s harm, but the exact amount of that part could not be established. See 
Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 76-83, 201-6; Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, ‘Indeterminate 
Causation and Apportionment of Damages: An Essay on Holtby, Allen and 
Fairchild’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 667.  
28 Fairchild  et al v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd et al. [2002] 3 WLR 89 (HL); 
Summers v. Tice (1948) 199 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1948). Some American courts awarded 
this remedy even against defendants whose negligence was unproven. See, for 
example, Ybarra v. Spangard 154 P. 2d 687 (Cal. 1944). This decision, however, is 
an outlier. 
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Courts, however, almost uniformly declined to adopt PRP in 
“unidentifiable wrongdoer” cases.29 This policy cannot be explained 
by the judges’ mistrust of mathematical probabilities, because they 
do something very similar to applying PRP when they apportion 
damages among jointly liable tortfeasors (and also between 
tortfeasors and their victims). The decision to reject PRP and hold 
wrongdoers jointly and severally liable for the victim’s entire damage 
is best explained by the courts’ desire to afford the victim maximal 
protection against wrongdoers’ insolvency.  
 
Another paradigmatic case features a wrongful risk-creator and a 
natural cause as two mutually exclusive explanations for the victim’s 
injury. Neither of these causal explanations can be confirmed or ruled 
out. Consider a doctor who negligently misdiagnosed a patient, 
thereby reducing the patient’s chances to recover. The patient 
ultimately did not recover, but this outcome is attributable to his 
preexisting medical condition for which the doctor is not responsible. 
Arguably, because of this condition, the patient would not have 
recovered even if the doctor diagnosed him properly. Assume that the 
probability of this argument, raised by the doctor, is 50% or higher, 
which means that the patient is unable to establish his causal 
allegation against the doctor by a preponderance of the evidence. We 
identify cases exhibiting these characteristics as “lost chance” cases. 
 
Under the traditional “winner takes all” approach, to which English 
courts adhere in such cases,30 the patient would recover no 
compensation whatsoever. Under PRP, in contrast, the patient would 
recover compensation that equals his harm multiplied by the 
probability of the causal claim that attributes this harm to the doctor’s 
29 The main American exception is the “Market Share Liability” doctrine: see 
Sindell v. Abbott 607 P. 2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Hymovitz v. Eli Lilly Co 539 N.E. 2d 
1069 (N.Y. 1989); and see text accompanying notes ___. The House of Lords 
applied PRP in a case where the harm to the plaintiff was the result of either a 
wrongful exposure to asbestos caused by his employer or of a non-wrongful 
exposure that occurred when the plaintiff was self-employed. See Barker v Corus 
UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572 (HL). The legislature, however, intervened specifically in 
order to reverse this ruling and enacted the Compensation Act 2006 (c. 29). This 
Act only applies to asbestos-related diseases. 
30 See Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909; Gregg 
v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 (HL). 
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negligence. In the United States, several courts have taken this route, 
while others have refused to do so.31 In a recent decision, the House 
of Lords considered the adoption of PRP for “lost chance“ cases, but 
decided against it by a 3-2 majority.32  
 
Another illustrative case involves a group of employees suffering 
from a disease that can be equally attributed to the employees’ 
predisposition to develop the disease and to their exposure to 
asbestos wrongfully caused by their employer. While it can be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that a certain 
percentage of the employees—typically less than 50% of them— 
suffering from the disease contacted it because of the wrongful 
exposure to asbestos, it cannot be established who those employees 
are. We define cases falling into this category as “unidentifiable 
victim” cases. Under the traditional “winner takes all” approach that 
applies in England and in the United States, the court must dismiss 
all employees’ suits against their employer. Under PRP, the 
employer must compensate all employees for the harm they suffered 
multiplied by the probability of the claim that the harm was caused 
by the employer’s wrongdoing.33 
 
B. The Vices of Probabilistic Recovery 
PRP offers an attractive solution to the problem of indeterminate 
causation that arises in past-injury cases. Under this principle, 
victims recover partial compensation for their possibly wrongful 
injuries and wrongdoers pay for their misdeeds rather than go scot-
free. On many occasions, PRP is preferable from an efficiency 
perspective because it promotes optimal deterrence of wrongdoers. 
The principle is also appealing as a retributive device because 
wrongdoers are required to pay for their wrongs even in the absence 
31 For applications of PRP see Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget 
Sound 664 P. 2d 474 (Wash 1983). For other approaches taken by American courts, 
see Porat & Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty, above n 27 at 73-76. 
32 Gregg v Scott, above n 30.  
33 Porat & Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty, above n 27 at 70-73, 193-195.  
See Barker v Corus, above n 29. Even though this case deals with a bit different 
scenario, it may signal the emergence of a different approach to PRP in general, 
and, specifically, to the principle’s application to “unidentifiable victim” cases. 
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of a clear-cut causal nexus between those wrongs and the victims’ 
harms (some theorists do not consider harm a sine qua non 
prerequisite of liability34). 
 
These virtues, however, come accompanied with a number of vices 
that some consider fatal. One of those vices, which we discuss first, 
is epistemological. All others are (interchangeably) operational and 
moral. 
 
As a factual matter, in each of the aforementioned cases, the 
defendant had either caused the plaintiff’s entire harm or no harm at 
all. The defendant certainly did not cause part of the harm. 
Consequently, all decisions that PRP prompts courts to deliver would 
be factually incorrect. This comprehensive incorrectness is a serious 
epistemological vice that also creates tensions with corrective 
justice.35 
 
Application of PRP would also present moral and operational 
hurdles. Courts would have to make complicated determinations of 
probabilities, instead of deciding cases on a “more probable than not” 
basis. That would increase litigation costs. In addition, PRP would 
allow courts to hold defendants liable on the basis of naked statistics. 
This liability format is contentious from a moral point of view.36 
Relatedly, PRP authorizes courts to impose liability for bare risks. 
This authorization is morally problematic as well: it clashes with the 
34 See C.H. Schroeder ‘Corrective Justice & Liability for Increasing Risks’ (1990)  
37 UCLA Law Review 439. For a retributivist account of harm as a pre-requisite for 
tort liability, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss’ in 
David G. Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1995) 387.   
35 See S.R. Perry, Risk, ‘Harm, and Responsibility’, in David G. Owen (ed), 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 321. But 
see M. Stauch, 'Causation, Risk, and Loss of Chance in Medical Negligence’ 
(1997) 17 Oxford Journal Legal Studies 205, 217-218, for the claim that ruling 
according to chances in past-injury cases is not contrary to the deterministic 
causation approach, since such a ruling does not make any claim about the state of 
the world, but, rather, about the state of our knowledge about the world. For a 
different view, see H. Reece, ‘Losses of Chances in the Law’ (1996) 59 Modern 
Law Review 188.  
36 Charles R. Nesson, ‘Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of 
Complexity’ (1979) 92 Harvard  Law Review 1187, 1225. 
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deeply entrenched moral intuition that considers the actual infliction 
of harm to be a prerequisite for imposing liability in torts.37 
According to this intuition, pure endangerment cannot be a reason for 
holding its creator liable.  
 
From the deterrence perspective, PRP might be operationally 
redundant, as the “winner takes all” rule works fine in deterring 
wrongdoers across cases. Under this rule, suits that are not 
preponderantly probable fail completely. This failure erodes 
deterrence because some (and possibly many) of the failed suits are 
meritorious. The “winner takes all” rule, however, also provides that 
suits with a probability greater than 0.5 are unqualified winners. 
Plaintiffs recover full compensation even when their claims are only 
slightly more probable than not. This provision increases the 
expected amount of compensation for prospective wrongdoers and 
compensates for the erosion of deterrence on the other side. 
 
Furthermore, PRP breaks away from the minimal proof 
requirement—preponderance of the evidence—set by the law as a 
condition for authorizing courts to extract payments from defendants. 
This requirement is far from technical: it derives from a more general 
principle of evenhandedness that limits the courts’ power to force 
transfers of money and property from one individual to another. 
Under this principle, a court must not order such a transfer unless the 
reasons for forcing it out are better than the reasons for preserving the 
status quo. In the domain of fact-finding, the required “better 
reasons” must be present in the probability of the plaintiff’s case. 
When the plaintiff’s claims are not more probable than the 
defendant’s, the court has no reasons for changing the status quo.38 
C. Refinements  
In this section, we outline a number of refinements in the conditions 
for applying PRP. Those refinements help identify cases in which the 
principle’s vices fade away, partially or even completely. These cases 
37 Perry, above n 35. 
38 Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2005) at 219-25.  
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call for PRP’s application because the principle’s attractiveness is no 
longer offset by its vices 
 
One refinement is a temporal distinction between two different 
categories of cases. Both categories involve causal indeterminacy. 
One of those categories accommodates cases in which the 
indeterminacy related to a past occurrence and was present all the 
time. Cases falling into another category are different. In those cases, 
causal indeterminacy attaches to a hypothetical or future event that 
can be characterized as a past occurrence only at a later point in 
time.39 This distinction eliminates the epistemological vice. Consider 
a wrongdoing that has just been perpetrated and assume that the 
prospective victim did not yet suffer the harm associated with that 
wrongdoing. At this point in time, the prospective victim can only 
complain about his wrongful exposure to a risk of sustaining the 
harm. His future prospects became blurred (or more blurred than 
previously) due to the unwelcome imposition of the new risk of 
harm. The wrongdoing thus made the victim’s future prospects less 
desirable and, consequently, less valuable than before.40 Note that 
this assessment of the victim’s ex ante situation will remain 
unmodified even if at a later stage he sustains the anticipated harm 
without being able to associate it with the wrongdoing. The 
worsened-prospect description of the prospective victim’s situation is 
therefore empirically correct for the point in time at which the 
wrongdoing 
 
Compare this scenario with a different setup, in which the plaintiff 
suffers harm immediately after the defendant’s wrongdoing. Assume 
that the probability of the allegation that the defendant’s wrongdoing 
caused the harm is 0.5 or less, and that the plaintiff consequently 
cannot establish that the defendant caused his harm. This setup 
features no exposure-to-risk point along its timeline. There is no 
point in time (save for points in time that are completely artificial) at 
which the value of the plaintiff’s future prospects decreases. The 
worsened-prospect description therefore does not fit this setup. As a 
39 The House of Lords analyzed this distinction in Gregg v Scott, above n 30, at 
181-183, without determining its implications. 
40 See below Part III for further discussion of cases where the victim’s future is 
blurred with uncertainty at the time of the trial. 
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result, any verdict other than no-liability or full-liability would be 
empirically unfounded. This “all or nothing” setup is present in a 
case in which an obstetrician negligently induces labor and the baby 
he delivers dies. Assume that the baby’s death could result from the 
obstetrician’s negligence, or, alternatively, from the acute respiratory 
problem which could not have been overcome even if the obstetrician 
had taken due care. In this scenario, there was no point of time at 
which the baby’s prospects of survival decreased by less than 100%. 
Those prospects were either unaffected or completely eliminated by 
the obstetrician’s negligence.  
 
Another important refinement of PRP relies on a differentiation 
between shortages of evidence. In some cases, courts need scientific 
information about causation, but this information is not available. In 
other cases, courts do not have enough case-specific evidence for 
deciding the case. In the first category of cases, causal indeterminacy 
is uniformly present in the fact-pattern of every case. In the second 
category, it presents itself uniquely in each individual case.41 
Applying PRP in the first category of cases is more straightforward 
than in the second. When the uncertainty problem is general, some 
wrongdoers systematically escape liability. This happens when the 
probability of causation is 50% or less and plaintiffs are 
systematically denied remedies under the preponderance standard. 
This effect is present in unidentifiable-wrongdoer cases, in 
unidentifiable-victim cases, and in many of the lost-chance cases. In 
those cases, the redundancy objection to PRP does not hold. Under 
the “winner takes all” rule, all defendants—many of whom 
wrongfully damaged their plaintiffs—are held not liable. This 
outcome is both unjust and inefficient. To avoid this outcome, the 
legal system needs to implement PRP. This need makes PRP crucial 
rather than redundant. 
 
For similar reasons, one cannot easily object to PRP by alluding to 
the problematics of naked statistical evidence. When uncertainty is 
present in every case and case-specific evidence is systematically 
scarce, adherence to the rule against naked statistics is a logical 
equivalent of a rule that absolves all defendants—many of whom are 
41 See Gregg v Scott, above n 31, at  184.  
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wrongdoers—from liability in torts. Adoption of PRP is the only 
plausible way to avoid this unjust and inefficient result.  
 
When causal indeterminacy is recurrent in a well-defined category of 
cases, litigation costs triggered by the PRP are far from being crucial. 
Indeed, under PRP, courts would have to deal with mathematical 
probabilities and rely on experts more often than under the extant 
regime. Courts, however, would also develop expertise and amass 
information about causes, effects and probabilities. These knowledge 
and expertise would be applicable in many cases. This economy of 
scale would partially offset the increase in litigation costs. More 
crucially, in cases where uncertainty systematically allows 
wrongdoers in a specific field to escape liability, the inefficiency that 
PRP’s adoption would avert outweighs any foreseeable increase in 
litigation cost.  
 
Last, the torts system needs to pay special attention to cases in which 
the same wrongdoer recurrently causes harm. These cases are 
qualitatively different from those featuring wrongdoing as a unique 
or sporadic event. This distinction is important because in cases 
falling into the recurrent wrongdoer category, virtually none of the 
objections to PRP is valid. Consider the well-known case of DES, a 
drug designed to prevent miscarriages that was manufactured by 
hundreds of companies, mainly in the ‘50s and turned out to be 
latently carcinogenic to female fetuses. Twenty-five years later, 
numerous young women whose mothers had taken the drug were 
diagnosed with uterine cancer. It was found by the courts that the 
drug had not been tested adequately prior to its marketing and that 
the manufacturers had failed to take into account certain findings that 
had pointed to a risk of carcinogenic effect. Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs’ mothers had never been cautioned against this risk. 
Finally, the drug had been marketed under a generic rather than brand 
name, which foiled attempts to trace each pill back to its actual 
manufacturer.42 For the purpose of providing a remedy to the 
victims, courts developed the Market Share Liability doctrine (MSL). 
Under this doctrine, first adopted by the California Supreme Court in 
Sindell,43 every defendant manufacturer was to assume liability for 
42 See Sindell v. Abbott, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  
43 Ibid. 
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the plaintiff’s harm unless it could prove (by a preponderance of the 
evidence) that it did not manufacture the drug taken by the plaintiff’s 
mother. As the Sindell court clarified, this liability had to be imposed 
only on those manufacturers who produced a substantial proportion 
of DES in the relevant market. The court ultimately decided that the 
burden of compensating each plaintiff for her damage would be 
allocated amongst the manufacturers in accordance with their 
respective shares in the DES market.44               
 
In the DES cases, recovery was probabilistic: the market share of 
each defendant substituted for the probability that the litigated harm 
was caused by that defendant. But since for each defendant the 
wrongdoing was a recurring event, in the long run, MSL made each 
defendant liable for the harm it actually caused. Indeed, each 
defendant was obligated to compensate other defendants’ victims, but 
at the end of the day, after all claims have been satisfied, the final 
outcome was the same as in a case featuring no causal indeterminacy 
whatsoever.45  
 
The DES scenario is far from being the only case in which PRP 
would make the wrongdoers internalize the harm they actually 
caused. Unidentifiable-victim cases often exhibit the same 
characteristic. Take the asbestos case discussed above, in which 
many employees were negligently exposed to asbestos by the same 
employer. In this case, PRP would make the employer pay money 
damages that correspond to the harm it caused. This socially 
desirable effect will be achieved by allowing a compensatory 
distortion. Because each of the injuries was either caused in its 
entirety by the employer’s wrongdoing or by a natural cause, none of 
the employees will receive compensation for the harm wrongfully 
inflicted upon him or her. But this distortion is not a serious problem. 
Under any plausible criterion of justice and efficiency, allowing each 
employee to recover partial compensation while holding the 
44  This decision can be understood as imposing liability on each defendant for all of 
the plaintiff’s damage (in which case, equitable apportionment of the compensation 
burden could be achieved through wrongdoers’ indemnification claims against each 
other) or, alternatively, as imposing liability on each defendant for a prorated part 
of that damage. See Brown v Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485-487 (Cal. 1988) 
(adopting the second interpretation of Sindell). 
45 We assume that none of the defendants becomes insolvent. 
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employer liable for the harm it wrongfully caused is better than 
leaving all employees uncompensated and letting the employer go 
scot-free.  
 
All the objections to PRP fade away when the principle is applied to 
recurrent-wrongdoer cases. The epistemological objection vanishes 
because wrongdoers eventually pay for the harms they actually cause. 
Moreover, in many (but not all) cases, victims of torts are 
compensated for their actual harms (DES cases are the prime 
example of this category of cases). The objection alluding to the 
minimum proof threshold weakens as well because there would be no 
significant departures from the proof requirements that ordinarily 
apply in civil cases. Under PRP, the plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a 
recurrent wrongdoing. The plaintiff also must preponderantly 
establish the approximate amount of the aggregate harm resulting 
from the defendant’s wrongdoing. Arguments criticizing PRP for 
establishing liability for bare risks become inapplicable, too. In cases 
involving recurrent wrongdoers, defendants would not be paying for 
bare risks. Rather, they would pay for the harms they actually caused. 
Finally, when recurring-wrongdoer cases systematically feature 
probability of causation of less than 50%, and case-specific evidence 
is scarce, also the naked statistics, the redundancy and the litigation 
costs objections lose most of their power.   
 
The table below summarizes the applicability of the different 
objections to PRP: 
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Frequency of WrongsType of UncertaintyType of Event
RecurrentDiscreteInherentCase 
Specific
Future/
Hypothetical
Past
N/AAAAN/AAEpistemological 
Problem
N/AAN/AAAALitigation Costs
N/AAN/AAAANaked Statistics
N/AAAAAALiability for Bare 
Risk
N/AAN/AAAARedundancy
N/AAAAAAMinimum 
Threshold
 
 
A = applicable. 
N/A = non-applicable. 
 
D. Quantum of Damages 
In the paragraphs below, we distinguish between two types of 
probability-based compensation:  
 
1.  forward-looking compensation for the risk 
of future injury; and 
 
2.  backward-looking compensation, based on 
the probability of causation.46 
 
Take a person who sustains injury after being wrongfully exposed to 
a risk of sustaining that injury. Before the wrongdoing, this victim’s 
probability of sustaining the injury equaled 1-p (e.g., 0.25), which is 
                                                     
46 This discussion is based on Porat & Stein, ‘Indeterminate Causation’, above n 27 
at  685-688. 
FUTURE HARMS.DOC 8/18/2009  3:54 PM 
2009] Future Harm 21 
 
 
parallel to her probability of remaining uninjured (p) (i.e., 0.75). 
After the wrongdoing, the victim’s probability of sustaining the 
injury became 1-q (e.g., 0.75), which parallels her probability of 
escaping the injury (q) (i.e., 0.25). Because the victim actually 
sustained the injury, her case falls into the 1-q category (i.e., the 0.75 
category). This statistical category comprises two jointly exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive scenarios that reflect the victim’s initial 
position. In the first scenario, the victim sustains the injury 
irrespective of the wrongdoing. Under this scenario, the victim was 
doomed to sustain the injury, so that the wrongdoing made no impact 
on her well-being. As already indicated, the probability of that 
scenario equals 1-p (i.e., 0.25). In the second scenario, it is the 
wrongdoing that causes the victim’s injury. Under this scenario, the 
victim would have remained uninjured had she not been exposed to 
the wrongdoing. The probability of this scenario equals (1-q)-(1-p), 
that is, p-q (i.e., 0.50). This ex ante probability represents the 
reduction in the victim’s chances of remaining uninjured, as effected 
by the wrongdoing. 
 
Now consider the probability of the scenario that the wrongdoing was 
the actual cause of the victim’s injury. This probability is represented 
by the fraction of scenarios featuring a victim who could not sustain 
her injury without being subjected to a wrongdoing in the more 
general cluster of cases that feature an injured victim, a wrongdoing, 
and the exhaustive variety of causal factors that could inflict the same 
injury on the victim. The above fraction of scenarios equals p-q (i.e., 
0.50). The cluster of cases covering all possible scenarios equals 1-q 
(i.e., 0.75). The ex post probability of the scenario in which the 
wrongdoing actually inflicts the victim’s injury therefore equals (p-
q)/(1-q) (that is, 0.50 / 0.75 = 2/3). 
 
As we already mentioned, the victim’s risk of sustaining injury as a 
result of the wrongdoing equals p-q (i.e., 0.50). So long as the victim 
lives under the risk of becoming injured, his expected damage 
therefore equals (p-q)D (i.e., D/2), when D denotes the average 
amount of harm suffered by similarly situated victims. This expected 
damage is what the victim facing the risk of injury or illness should 
recover from the wrongdoer.  
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Victims who actually become ill should be compensated differently. 
Using the same notation and the same numerical example as before, 
let p (i.e., 0.75) and q (i.e., 0.25) denote, respectively, the victim’s 
chances of remaining uninjured before and after the wrongdoing. 
Allow D to denote the average amount of damage that the 
wrongdoing inflicts in the long run of cases, and let T denote the total 
number of cases in which the tortious activity takes place. The ideal 
compensation that the legal system should exact from the wrongdoer 
would thus equal (p-q)DT (i.e., DT/2). 
 
In reality, however, only injured victims can successfully sue the 
wrongdoer. Therefore, the number of cases in which the wrongdoer 
would have to pay compensation would equal (1-q)T (i.e., 0.75T). If 
the wrongdoer compensates each injured victim at the amount of (p-
q)D (i.e., D/2), then the wrongdoer’s compensation duty would fall 
below the optimal. Using the probability of causation as an award-
multiplier would eliminate this shortfall. As already established, the 
probability of causation equals (p-q)/(1-q) (i.e., 2/3). Each injured 
victim’s compensation would consequently be set at [(p-q)/(1-q)]D 
(i.e., 2/3·D). The total amount of the wrongdoer’s compensation duty 
would then be [(p-q)/(1-q)]DT(1-q), that is: (p-q)DT (i.e., DT/2). 
This compensation duty equals the losses inflicted by the 
wrongdoer.47 
 
American courts tend to conflate the two types of compensation by 
awarding injured victims the risk-based, rather than probability-
based, amounts.48 The draft of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, 
47 Note that when the probability of causation is greater than 0.5, the court may 
decide to apply the “winner takes all” rule and award the plaintiff full 
compensation. 
48 For examples of this mistaken approach in the United States, see, for example, 
Wendland v Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Iowa 1998) (an oft-cited decision 
analogizing the value of lost chances to that of a lottery ticket); Mays v United 
States (1985, DC Colo) 608 F. Supp. 1476, revd on other grounds (CA10 Colo) 
806 F.2d 976, cert den 482 US 913 (upon finding that malpractice reduced the 
patient’s chances of recovery from 40 to 15 per cent, the court reasoned that the 
damage related to net pecuniary loss caused by the medical centre was 25 per cent 
of the $173,200 total net pecuniary loss, or $43,300);  Herskovits v Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (holding a 14% reduction, 
from 39% to 25%, in the decedent’s chance for survival as sufficient evidence to 
allow the case to go to the jury); Alberts v Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1287 (N.M. 
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TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft No. 1) 
proposes to fix this error by differentiating, as we do, between the 
two types of awards.49 
III. Future Harms 
In numerous cases in which one person acts wrongfully towards 
another, the prospective victim faces a continuous risk of illness that 
may or may not materialize in the future. Employees are exposed to 
the risk of contracting an occupational disease due to unsafe working 
conditions; residents of a polluted neighborhood face the risk of 
becoming ill as a result of their exposure to pollution; consumers of 
defective products have a prospect of contracting diseases from those 
products; victims of medical malpractice face the risk of developing 
an affliction or handicap; and there are many other examples. 
 
Should faulty creators of such risks assume liability in torts for the 
ensuing prospect of future illness? 
 
This question is puzzling. Why not wait and see what happens in the 
end? If the risk materializes into harm, its creator should then be 
obligated to compensate the victim; and if the victim remains 
unharmed, he should receive no compensation at all. Note that 
 
1999) (if medical malpractice reduced the patient’s chance of recovery from fifty to 
twenty percent, that patient’s compensation would be equal to thirty percent of the 
value of his or her life); Jorgenson v Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 372 (S.D. 2000) (if 
instead of completely eliminating the chance of recovery, the physician’s 
negligence merely reduced the chance of recovery from 40% to 20%, then the 
value of the lost chance would be 20% of the value of a complete recovery); Smith 
v Washington 734 N.E,2d 548 (Ind. 2000) (affirming an award of 50% of the 
patient’s damage upon finding that the defendant’s malpractice increased the 
patient’s risk of incurring an already likely injury from 50% to 100%).  For reasons 
provided above, the claimant should have recovered 29 per cent of the damage in 
Mays; 19 per cent of the damage in Herskovits; 37.5 per cent of the damage in the 
Alberts example; and 25 per cent of the damage in the Jorgenson example.  In 
Smith, the outcome was correct because the defendant’s malpractice totally 
eliminated the claimant’s chances of recovery. Otherwise, the court’s adherence to 
the lottery analogy would have generated an error (as it did in our previous 
examples).  
49 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 
26 cmt n, (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, April 6, 2005).  
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statutes of limitations would not deny compensation to victims who 
ultimately sustain harm because those victims’ causes of action 
accrue only after the occurrence of the harm.50 The repose provisions, 
in contrast, would yield a different result. These provisions render all 
suits non-actionable after a specified post-transgression period. The 
fact that the victim’s harm had developed only after the statutory 
deadline is immaterial. This fact can toll a limitations period, but not 
a statute of repose because repose provisions have a special goal: to 
reduce the volume of litigation by denying actionability to suits in 
which the defendant’s wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s harm are 
separated by a long period of time.51 This policy purposefully 
extinguishes all suits alleging deferred illness (or other latent 
injuries) that are filed after the expiration of the repose period. 
Whether prospective victims should be allowed to bypass this policy 
by suing wrongdoers for their prospects of illness consequently 
becomes a big question. This question concerns the limits that the 
law should impose upon suits for future harm, while our goal here is 
to determine whether such suits should ever be allowed to proceed. 
We therefore leave this question open. 
  
The Law Lords in Johnston have upheld the rule that allows 
compensation for a future illness that might develop from the 
plaintiff’s present injury, for which the defendant is responsible.52 
The prospect of future illness can thus be perceived as attaching to 
the present injury and becoming part of the plaintiff’s present 
physical condition. Alternatively, this prospect instills in the plaintiff 
fear and anxiety that attach to his present pain and suffering. In both 
cases, the prospect’s attachment is a legal move that creates a fusion 
between the plaintiff’s present condition and future possibilities.  
 
This move is artificial because in the empirical world no attachment 
actually occurs. Theoretically (and more than just theoretically), even 
with a present injury, the court could tell the plaintiff “Wait and see 
what, if anything, happens with your risk. If it materializes, come and 
see us; and if not then not.”  
 
50 See, e.g., Baird v. American Medical Optics, 713 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1998). 
51 See, e.g., Rudenauer  v. Zafiropoulos, 445 Mass. 353 (2005). 
52 Johnston, above n 3 at para 67. 
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But why not abandon the artificial devices that operate in this area of 
the law? Why not allow a tort victim to recover compensation not 
only for the risks attaching to her existing injury but also for a free-
standing risk of future illness? We now turn to discussing this 
question. 
A. The Case for Liability 
The case for making risks of future illness actionable in torts is 
straightforward. A person’s prospect of becoming seriously ill erodes 
his well-being. Consider two people who happen to be equal in all 
respects except one: one of those people has a prospect of developing 
a serious illness in the future, while the other has no such prospect. 
The second person’s well-being outscores the well-being of the first 
person (if forced to live one of those people’s lives, a rational 
individual would prefer to be the second person rather than the first). 
Assume now, that the first person did not come upon this misfortune 
by himself. His prospect of becoming seriously ill resulted from 
exposure to a toxic substance by a negligent wrongdoer. We argue 
that under such circumstances, the law should allow the prospective 
victim to choose between immediate recovery of compensation for 
his expected harm and a postponed entitlement to recover full 
compensation in the event of illness (for the sake of simplicity, our 
ensuing discussion assumes that once the illness develops, the court 
can verify with sufficient certainty that it was caused by the 
wrongdoing). 
 
The victim should be able to recover from the wrongdoer 
compensation for the wrongfully imposed risk. The amount of this 
compensation equals the harm associated with the illness multiplied 
by the victim’s probability of becoming ill due to the wrongdoing. 
That amount typically represents the victim’s increased cost in 
purchasing health or life insurance due to his or her wrongful 
exposure to the risk. After paying this compensation to the victim, 
the wrongdoer will become immune from further liability. If the 
victim’s ultimately becomes ill, he would not be allowed to collect 
from the wrongdoer the difference between the expected and the 
actual harm. Alternatively, the victim should be able to wait and see 
whether he actually becomes ill. If he becomes ill, the wrongdoer 
would have to fully compensate him for the harm suffered. If the 
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victim develops no illness, however, the wrongdoer would pay 
nothing. 
 
The victim should be allowed to choose between these remedies for a 
number of reasons. From the wrongdoer’s perspective, the two 
remedies are economically identical. Therefore, he has no legitimate 
reasons to oppose their substitution by one another. Assume that the 
wrongdoer exposed ten victims to a 10% risk of sustaining physical 
harm in the amount of $1,000,000. Regardless of whether victims 
recover immediate compensation for their expected harm or are 
compensated in the future, if and when their harm materializes, the 
wrongdoer’s expected liability would be the same: $1,000,000. 
Equally important, this liability also reflects the wrongdoing’s social 
cost. Indeed, under our proposal, each victim would choose between 
immediate compensation in the amount of $100,000 and future 
compensation in the amount of $1,000,000, if harm materializes. This 
choice would not change the wrongdoer’s expected liability. 
 
Yet, it might change the wrongdoer’s liability de facto. To illustrate, 
assume that nine victims out of ten recover $100,000 each, while the 
tenth victim who chooses to wait and see. Subsequently, this victim 
sustains the harm and recovers $1,000,000. In this scenario, the 
wrongdoer ends up paying 1.9 million dollars rather than one million. 
But that possibility should not bother us. If our proposal is adopted, 
the insurance market would allow the risk-averse wrongdoer to 
insure against the risk of paying the ninth victim $1,000,000. The 
cost of this insurance would be around $100,000.53 
 
As we already explained, the wrongdoer has no legitimate reasons 
upon which to base a claim that those two remedies are not identical 
to each other. The wrongdoer, for example, cannot invoke its 
hypothetical prospect of becoming insolvent in the future as a reason 
for not compensating the victim for his presently expected harm. Nor 
can the wrongdoer benefit from the victim’s prospective inability to 
furnish evidence (typically, a long time after the wrongdoing’s 
occurrence) that would causally relate his illness to the toxic 
exposure (given the presence of competing causes to which the 
53 We thank Lord Hoffman for raising this issue when our paper was presented at 
the Aberdeen University symposium on causation. 
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victim would be exposed before suing). The wrongdoer also should 
not be allowed to take advantage of the victim’s prospect of 
becoming fatally ill—a condition that may extinguish the victim’s 
ability and motivation to wage a legal battle. 
 
All those prospects entail a risk of injustice for the victim: they 
indicate that denial of the victims’ right to be compensated in the 
present for the risk of future harm may erode their entitlement to 
compensation if and when their physical harm materializes. Those 
prospects also dilute deterrence: wrongdoers expecting to under-
compensate their victims in the future will be inefficiently under-
deterred. The erosion-of-compensation prospect thus does not merely 
offset the wrongdoer’s complaint about being held liable for bare 
risk. This prospect is an affirmative reason for imposing such 
liability.  
 
The proposed liability system would bring about additional social 
benefits. First, when the future harm is a fatal disease, expedited 
compensation would allow victims to use the money they get during 
their lifetime.54 Second, some victims might be able to use their 
expedited compensation towards mitigation of the risk of harm. For 
example, a victim might be able to undergo extensive medical tests 
and obtain preventive treatments that reduce her prospect of illness. 
Victims would also be able to change places of residence, work and 
lifestyles. Finally, some of the victims would also be able to purchase 
life and medical insurance. The cost of this insurance would increase 
as a result of the wrongdoing—yet another independent reason to 
have the wrongdoer pay for it.55 
54 For an argument in the same vein, in another context, see David Friedman, 
‘What is “fair compensation” for death or injury?’ (1982) 2 International Review of 
Law and Economics 81. 
55 Even under a regime that imposes no liability for future harms, courts should 
allow recovery for money and efforts expended by victims on reducing such risks. 
For principles governing such awards, see Mark Geistfeld, ‘The Analytics of Duty: 
Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of Economic Loss’ (2002) 88 Virginia Law 
Review 1921, 1940-1949; Kenneth S. Abraham, ‘Liability for Medical Monitoring 
and the Problem of Limits’, (2002) 88 Virginia Law Review 1975; John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, ‘Unrealized Torts’, (2002) 88 Virginia Law 
Review  1626. Furthermore, even when a tort victim sustains no physical injury, 
courts should allow her to recover compensation for fear of future illness and for 
the increased cost of her health and life insurance. See Porat & Stein, Tort Liability 
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B. Objections 
We now return to the objections raised against PRP as applied to 
past-injury cases. We consider the validity of those objections in the 
present context and find them unpersuasive. Subsequently, we 
consider some additional—more powerful—objections to our 
proposal. 
 
The epistemic objection to probabilistic recovery falls apart once it is 
recognized—as an empirical matter—that a person’s risk of 
becoming ill in the future erodes her well-being. This erosion is self-
evident: risk of illness is an unquestionably unwanted condition. 
Indeed, it is epistemically rational for a person to buy insurance 
against such risks or to avoid them by paying a steep price (for 
example, by exercising and eating healthy, but untasty, food). The 
relationship between risk of future harm and people’s well-being in 
the present is straightforward when the risk is for future property 
harm. In this case, the present market value of the property will be 
discounted by the risk of harm even the risk is below 50%. For 
example, if a wrongdoer created a 30% risk that the victim’s house 
will collapse in the future, this risk would certainly reduce the 
house’s market value. Admittedly, this analogy is far from perfect 
because, unlike real property and commodities, life and limb are not 
tradable. Yet, as we have demonstrated, risks to a person’s life and 
health constitute detraction from her well-being. Those risks bring 
into the person’s life deleterious economic and non-economic 
consequences.  
 
Litigation costs do not present a serious problem either. These costs 
should be considered money well spent, given the benefits that the 
proposed system would yield. Courts would also be able to reduce 
those costs by relying on information generated by the market for 
health and life insurance. Based on this information and expert 
testimony, courts should be able to evaluate risks and damages both 
adequately and expediently.    
 
Courts also should not be reluctant to base wrongdoers’ liability for 
future illnesses upon naked statistical evidence. This evidence is 
 
Under Uncertainty, above n 27 at 121. 
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often the only proof that the plaintiff can furnish. Her inability to 
adduce case-specific evidence is hardly a good reason for allowing 
the defendant to go scot-free, especially when the defendant’s 
wrongdoing is recurrent.  
 
The objection against liability for bare risks is equally unpersuasive.  
We do not discuss here the pros and cons of a legal regime that 
imposes liability for risks, as opposed to harms. We have done it 
elsewhere.56 As a general matter, arguments against liability for bare 
risks lose much of their validity when there is uncertainty as to 
whether the plaintiff was or will be harmed by the defendant’s 
wrongdoing.57 Furthermore, as we already explained, in cases 
involving risk of future harm, the plaintiff would normally be able to 
establish that this risk already constitutes harm for him or her. 
 
The redundancy objection to our proposal would insist that a 
prospective victim should wait and see whether she actually becomes 
ill. As we already explained, however, there are good reasons for 
allowing the victim to choose between immediate recovery of 
compensation for her expected harm and the “wait and see” option. 
Allowing the wrongdoer to dictate this choice to the victim would 
defeat justice and efficiency at once. Actionability of future illnesses 
thus cannot be considered redundant. 
 
Finally, the minimum-threshold objection should not bother us at all. 
Under our system, risk of future illness would be actionable as a 
matter of substantive law. To succeed in an action for such risk, the 
plaintiff would have to prove its nature and extent by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff would also have to 
preponderantly establish that the risk originated from the defendant’s 
wrongful action. The conventional principles of proof would thus 
stay intact.  
 
Typically (albeit not always), the uncertainty as to whether the 
plaintiff will develop illness in the future is inherent in the entire 
category of cases, as opposed to being present due to the absence of 
56 Ibid, at 103-115.  
57 Ibid, at 116-129.   
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case-specific evidence. As we explained above,58 in such cases, the 
objections to PRP fade away. Furthermore, as we have shown in  
relation to past-injury cases,59 the recurrent character of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing should be taken into account as well. When 
a repeat wrongdoer compensates each victim for her probabilistic 
harm, he ultimately pays the victims the right amount of 
compensation. The same mechanism will work well in future-harm 
cases when the defendant is a repeat wrongdoer.    
 
Two additional objections against our proposal have more merit. 
These objections help set the limits to our proposed liability regime. 
 
One of those objections focuses on the magnitude of the risk of 
illness. Sometimes, many people are exposed to a risk of illness, but 
only a few of them actually become ill. Consider a polluter who 
exposes 1,000,000 residents to a small risk of a serious illness. 
Damage associated with that illness equals $1,000,000 and its 
probability is 1:100,000 for each resident. That means that 10 out of 
1,000,000 residents would suffer significant injury at some point in 
the future. For obvious reasons, allowing each of 1,000,000 residents 
to sue the polluter for his or her expected harm in the amount of $10 
makes no sense. Small risks of future illness should not be 
actionable. 
 
We agree with this limitation to our proposal. Subject to this 
limitation, however, whenever there is enough information for 
evaluating victims’ expected harm, prospective victims should be 
allowed to sue wrongdoers for risks of future illness.   
 
C. The Problem of Collective Action 
The remaining objection to our proposal identifies a serious problem 
of collective action. Suppose that victims can choose between 
immediate recovery for risks and future recovery for harms. For 
reasons discussed earlier, some victims would prefer immediate 
recovery. Their consumption of this remedy, however, will diminish 
58 Above  text accompanying notes.  
59 Above text accompanying notes. 
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the wrongdoers’ resources and increase the risk that the wrongdoers 
would be unable to meet their obligations to victims who sue for 
materialized harms. A similar problem troubled Justice Kennedy in 
Ayres, who disagreed with a rule that allows recovery for fears of 
contracting cancer in the future. Justice Kennedy’s reasons for 
disagreeing with this rule included the prediction that fear-based 
recovery of compensatory awards would exhaust the financial 
resources that defendants could use for compensating asbestos 
victims who actually develop cancer.60   
 
But the problem at hand may be even more severe. If some potential 
victims (Group A) sue the wrongdoer for their risks of future 
illness—and they may have perfectly good reasons for filing those 
suits—other potential victims (Group B), who originally preferred to 
sue only in the event of illness, would find themselves in a different 
position. The increased risk of the wrongdoer’s insolvency might 
prompt some of those victims to sue immediately. This choice will 
snowball: any additional suit—that is, any victim migration from 
Group B to Group A—will further increase the risk of the 
wrongdoer’s insolvency. As a result, none of the potential victims 
would wait. All of them would migrate from Group B to Group A 
and sue the wrongdoer immediately. As in the “Tragedy of the 
Commons”, the ensuing flood of suits might exacerbate the 
wrongdoer’s insolvency to the detriment of all victims. 
 
This problem calls for a regulatory solution. One such solution is to 
authorize courts to deal with the prospect of the wrongdoer’s 
insolvency on a case-by-case basis. If this prospect is insignificant, 
the court should allow the plaintiff to sue the defendant for the risk of 
future illness. If the prospect is real, the court should stay the 
proceeding and require the plaintiff to substitute her suit by a limited-
fund class action.61 Another solution is to set up a statutory fund to 
which wrongdoers would have to contribute sums that equal the 
amount of their victims’ expected harm (a Pigouvian tax). This 
60 Ayres, above n 2 at 168-169.  
61 The goal of this proceeding is to make sure that all plaintiffs get compensated 
and that early filers of suits do nor exhaust the defendant’s funds. See, e.g., Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
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solution is particularly suitable for cases involving recurrent 
wrongdoers. 
 
Conclusion  
Probability-based compensation is a controversial remedy that 
departs from the established legal tradition. This remedy is fairly 
common, but still controversial, in the United States. Courts in 
England and other jurisdictions use it on rare occasions.  
 
Most cases in which this remedy was used—or could be used, if 
courts did not feel reluctant about it—involved causally 
indeterminate harm that the plaintiffs already sustained. Under such 
circumstances, even a partial success of the plaintiff’s suit clashed 
with conventional wisdom. This wisdom requires courts to dismiss as 
unproven any suit that fails to satisfy the preponderance-of-the-
evidence requirement. An attempt to bypass this requirement by 
awarding plaintiffs probability-based compensation consequently 
becomes suspicious. This suspicion accounts for the tort systems’ 
widespread refusal to treat risk of future illness as actionable harm. 
Another reason that explains this refusal is a general belief that future 
harm, without more, is identical to bare risk—an actuarial, rather 
than concrete, endangerment for which courts should impose no 
liability.  
 
This article questioned the validity of these two analogies. We hope 
to have shown that these analogies are untidy, if not altogether 
invalid. We also hope to have demonstrated that there are good 
reasons for treating serious risks of future illness or injury as 
actionable harm. If we are right, courts that persistently refused to 
allow probabilistic recoveries in past-injury cases should reconsider 
their position with regard to future harm. 
